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THE DOCTRINE OF MARKETABLE TITLE IN CANADA+  
William Ian lnn£s*
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
Every executory con trac t  for the sale o f  real property contains, 
at com m on law, an im plici t1 covenant that the vendor will tender a 
m arke tab le  title. This rule is subject to any express te rm s o f  the 
agreem ent and is som etim es qualified by the actual knowledge of  the 
parties .2 The contract  may contain  an express term either adding to 
or derogating from the vendor’s com m on law obligation, but term s 
o f  the la tter  variety are strictly construed against the vendor. '  Even 
where the vendor only agrees to tender such title as he has, he must 
still disclose any unusual defects o f  which he is aw are .4
The doctrine of  m arke tab le  title is far from being an obscure 
legal construct.  The average prac tit ioner  encounters that doctrine 
daily:
1. in deciding whether to object to a “ defective” title,
2. in deciding whether the vendor has m ade a proper  tender 
upon closing a transaction ,
3. in certifying for the purchaser or m ortgagee tha t  the title is 
m arketable.
It is not within the com pass  of  this paper to examine the various
t  S O U R C E S : A s a prelim inary rem ark, th is writer m ust point out the extent to  
which he has drawn upon Annotation: M arketable Title, 57 A .L .R . 1253, for 
som e o f  the m aterial and m uch o f  the organization  found in this paper. That
work unquestionably constitu tes one o f  the m ost lucid and com prehensive studies 
o f  the law o f  m arketab le titles.
* M r. Innes is a m em ber o f  the N ew  Brunswick Bar and is a partner in the firm o f  
In n es/B ossé , M oncton , N . B.
The paper w as originally  prepared as a supplem entary writing program  under Dr. 
A .M . Sin cla ir, D ean o f  Law, U niversity o f  N ew  Brunswick, in A ptil, 1975.
1 S om e authority would say “ co lla tera l” : Ogilvie  v. Foljambe (1817), 36 E .R . 21, 
25.
2 Ball v. Gutschenritter, [1925] S .C .R . 68.
3 Id.
4 R e H aedicke, [1901] 2 Ch. 666.
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provincial s ta tu tes ' and com m only used standard  form agreem ents '1 
which re-define the obligations of  vendors. Rather, this paper is 
designed to examine the content o f  the te rm  “ m arke tab le” in C a n a ­
dian com m on law.
This paper  will only touch upon the problem o f  available 
remedies insofar as this becomes necessary to elucidate the central 
issue. Initially, one must be aware tha t the doctrine o f  m arke tab le  t i­
tle only applies to executory contracts .  In executed contracts  one is 
generally limited to an action for breach of  w arranty  of  ti tle. ' 
Secondly, it is essential to distinguish between m atte rs  o f  conveyance 
and defects o f  title. Encum brances will not m ake a vendor 's  title 
defective as long as he is in a position to remove them  by the date set 
for closing the transaction. Such encum brances are  term ed m atte rs  
o f  conveyance. A purchaser need not specifically requisition their 
removal; such removal is an integral par t  o f  the vendor’s obligation 
to tender  a proper conveyance. If the vendor fails to convey free 
from such encumbrances, the purchaser  may either repudiate the 
con trac t  or seek a decree o f  specific performance.
A defect o f  title involves some outstanding interest which is not 
within the vendor’s power to remove. This gives the purchaser an im ­
m ediate  right of  repudiation, or an al ternative right to specific per­
form ance with aba tem ent of  the purchase price.8 The right to object 
to a defect o f  title may be lost, either through the operation  o f  the 
doctrine of  waiver, or m ore  com m only  through the lapse o f  the 
agreed period for investigation o f  title under the contract.* In excep­
tional cases a purchaser may object to title after the expiry of  this 
agreed period, such severe defects are said to go to the root o f  the 
t i t le .10 Having completed an analysis (unfortunately, although neces­
sarily, inadequate) o f  the available remedies, one must now turn to 
an analysis of  the content o f  the te rm  “ m arke tab le” .
The doctrine of m arke tab le  title grew up in courts  o f  equity as a 
defence available to purchasers in actions to have contracts  for the 
sale o f  land specifically performed. Questions touching the validity
5 For a detailed discussion o f  the law in O ntario under the Investigations o f  Titles 
A ct R .S .O . 1950 c. 186, see W .G .C . H ow land, Objections to Title , Law S ociety  
o f  U pper C anada, Special Lectures, 1960, S a le  o f  Land, p. 221.
6 M any standard form agreem ents o f  sale specifically  exclude the vendor's ob liga­
tion with respect to easem ents, restrictions, covenants, etc. H ow ever, the courts  
have strictly construed such lim itations against vendors. See: Ball v. Gutschenrit- 
ter, supra n. 2.
7 D icastri, C anadian Law o f  Vendor and Purchaser, Carswell 1968, para. 791 et 
seq.
8 Ibid. para. 245, para. 579 et seq.
9 Ibid. para. 264 et seq.
10 W .G .C . H ow land, op cit., p. 224.
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of  title to real es tate were within the sole jurisdiction of  com m on law 
courts. The decree o f  a court o f  equity afforded no protection to a 
purchaser  whose title was subsequently challenged at com m on law:
I should be in a strange situation in desiring a purchaser to take this title  
because I think the point a pretty good one. though the Court o f  Exchequer 
having determ ined against it. It is telling him to try my opinion at his expense.11
Only where a title was free from any “ reasonable d o u b t” would a 
court of  equity force it upon an unwilling purchaser .12 The doctrine 
did not originally extend to actions a t C o m m o n  law. If a purchaser 
wanted to recover money paid in advance he had to show that the 
vendor’s title was bad, not merely doub tfu l ."  Today  however the 
doctrine extends to both legal and equitable remedies .14
The doctrine of  m arke tab le  title represents a jurisprudential 
com prom ise  between the severity o f  caveat emptor  and the im prac­
tical alternative of  requiring tender o f  perfect title. This latter 
course, given the complexity of  the law of real property, would 
render a vendor’s right to enforce an executory contract for the sale 
of  land virtually illusory. Equity chose a middle ground decreeing 
specific perform ance whenever it found a title free from reasonable 
doubt. The  acid test was whether the purchaser  would be exposed to 
any real hazard  o f  lit igation in order to defend the title he was to ac­
quire.
W ith the merger o f  com m on law and equity, if all the necessary 
parties are before a court,  it can resolve objections to title by making 
a final determ ination  o f  the validity o f  the vendor 's title; the 
purchaser will be protected by the doctrine of  res judicata. W here 
this is not the case, the court 's  p a ram oun t  concern is to protect the 
purchaser from any real th rea t o f  li t igation .1' T he court must still ex­
am ine the vendor’s title, but not with a view toward ultimately deter­
mining its validity; ra ther,  the court m ust determine whether there is 
any reasonable doubt as to the validity o f  the ti t le .16 The court may 
be compelled to find a title unm arke tab le  even if morally convinced 
of  its validity.17
W here the relevant facts are not in dispute and the validity of 
the vendor’s title depends on the resolution of a point of law, his title 
is m arke tab le  only when the law is so clearly in his favour tha t  it can 
be seen to be a m atte r  of  settled ju r isp rudence .1" Real doubt will
11 R ose  v. Cull and  (1800), 31 E .R . 537, 538 per Loughborough, L.C.
12 Pyrke  v. Waddingham  (1852), 68 E .R . 813.
14 Innes v. C ostello , (1917] 1 W .W .R . 1135, 1139 (A lta . C .A .)
15 Pyrke  v. W addingham , supra n. 12.
16 Ibid. p. 816.
17 Id.
18 Alexander v. M ills (1870), L .R . 6 Ch. 124, 131.
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generally arise where there are decisions,19 d ic ta ,2" o r  expert op in ion21 
tending to defeat the title. If  a court of  first instance has found a title 
doubtful,  an appellate court will only reverse such a finding if it is 
clearly wrong.22
If there is a dispute over the construction of  an instrum ent in the 
chain of  title, the weight o f  authority  must clearly favour the in­
te rpreta tion  advanced by the vendor. It is not enough however tha t  a 
purchaser advance another  possible in te rpre tat ion ,  tha t  in te rp re ta ­
tion must be reasonable in light o f  accepted principles o f  cons truc­
tion .23 A title is not m arke tab le  if the court itself has doub ts  abou t 
the construction  o f  such an instrument.  The sam e principle applies to 
the construction  of  wills,24 but where all parties having an interest un­
der a will join in a conveyance, doubt as to their respective shares is 
irrelevant.25 If there is a real doubt as to the existence2'’ or exercise2’ 
o f  a power of  sale this will render an otherwise valid title un­
m arketable,  but a power o f  sale is not doubtful merely because it 
arises by necessary implication .2" The sam e principle o f  reasonable 
doubt applies to  the construction of  all s ta tu tes  upon which the 
validity of  the title rests .29
A title is not normally unm arke tab le  simply because it is depen­
dent on the proof o f  extrinsic facts. N o t only must the vendor 
provide the purchaser  with conclusive proof o f  such facts, but such 
facts must also be capable of  p roof  at some future da te  if the 
purchaser  is brought to co u r t .30 The vendor may rely on any accepted
19 Re Thackwray and Young's Contract (1888), 40  ch. 34, 38. (T he Am erican  
Suprem e C ourt has adopted the rule that a title is deem ed to be doubtful where a 
court o f  co-ordinate jurisdiction has decided against the principle upon which it 
rests: W esley v. Ells (1900), 20 S. C t. 661, 664.).
20 Id.
21 M arlow  v. Sm ith  (1723), 24 E .R . 698.
22 Collier v. McBean  (1865). L. R. 1 Ch. 81. 85.
23 R adford  v. Willis (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 7, 11.
24 Pyrke  v. Waddingham , supra n. 12.
25 Re Lane and Beacham  (1912), 7 D .L .R . 311 (O nt. H .C .) (D ecided  on another  
point).
26 M ansfield  v. Toronto General Trust Corp. (1912), I D .L .R . 5 0 3 (M a n . K .B.); Re  
Cam pbell and H arwood  (1902), 1 O .W .R . 139 (W k . Ct.); Spellm an  v. L itovit:  
(1918). 44 O  R 30 (W k. C t.).
27 Alexander v. M ills, supra n. 18 For a sim ilar point see Cartlidge  v. Bendza 
(1956), 6 D .L .R . (2d) 301 (O nt. C .A .).
28 H am ilton  v. Buckmaster (1866), L .R . 3 Eq. 323.
29 Annotation: M arketable Title 57 A .L .R . 1253, 1365 et. seq
30 Lowes v. l.ush (1808), 33 E .R . 631.
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m eans o f  proof, including c ircum stantia l evidence and presumptions 
o f  fac t ,31 but if there  a re  no adequate  means for the p roof  or  in­
vestigation o f  necessary facts his title is unm arke tab le .33 While he is 
obliged to prove all facts necessary to support his title, he need not 
negate the existence of  those which might defeat i t .33 As to  suf­
ficiency o f  proof, A m erican  courts  have adopted the test tha t the 
facts proven must be such as would require a d irected verdict in a 
ju ry  tr ia l .34
C anad ian  courts  have adopted  the doctrine o f  m arke tab le  title 
but there is evidence of  a certain disparity  between th t  theory and its 
application. One does find examples of  an orthodox application o f  
the doctrine. A power of  sale which was the subject of  conflicting 
judicial authori ty  rendered a title unm arke tab le  in Re Thomas Mac- 
Nabb.}i The O n ta r io  C our t  o f  Appeal did not decree specific perfor­
m ance in Logan v. Stein36 until it had thoroughly examined a 
th rea tened  law suit and found it to be completely idle. A title which 
rested on the unregistered assignment o f  a vendor’s interest in an 
agreem ent of  sale was found too uncertain to be m arke tab le  in Re  
Aston and White.'1
Yet in Gunn v. Turner38 a recital in a 20-year old deed that the 
g ran to r  conveyed as adm in is tra to r  o f  his fa ther’s estate prevailed 
over direct evidence of  the previous appoin tm ent o f  another  person 
as adm in is tra to r  ad litem. In Re Tinning and Weber" the vendor had 
a life es tate  This was followed by a fee simple in her son, deter­
minable upon his dying without issue, followed by a springing ex­
ecutory interest in fee simple in the children o f  X. The vendor’s son 
had issue and conveyed his entire interest to the vendor, as had all of 
the children o f  X. The  purchaser objected on the ground tha t  X, a 54 
year old widow, could have other children. The court found that the 
vendor had a m arke tab le  fee simple. The  purchaser was only entitled 
to a moral rather  than a m athem atical certainty. In Re Hewitt and 
Armstrong*" the title rested on a she r if f  s deed which purported  (in 
excess of  his s ta tu tory  authori ty)  to subdivide the equity o f  redem p­
tion of  the deceased owner. There was some confusing evidence o f
31 Annotation, supra n. 29, at p. 1369 n. 13; p. 1370 n. 17.
32 Pyrke  v. Waddingham, supra  n. 12, at p. 817.
33 Annotation, supra  n. 29, at p. 1370, n. 15.
34 Potter  v. Ogden (1905), 59 A . 673, 474 (N .J ., Chan ).
35 (1882), 1 O .R . 94.
36 [1958] O .W .N . 343 (C .A .).
37 (1920), 48 O .R . 168 (W k. C t.).
38 (1900), 13 O .R . 158 (D iv . C t.).
39 (1904), 8 O .L .R . 703 (W k. C t.).
40  (1918), 14 O .W .N . 139 (M idd leton , J.).
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concurrence in the sale by the deceased ow ner’s executors. The court 
found that since those executors were alone in a position to question 
the sale, the title was not doubtful.  Such cases seem indicative o f  a 
judicial tendency to ease the obligations of  vendors.
There  is little ju r isprudence in this country  specifically directed 
to the definition of  the term “ m ark e tab le” . W hat one does find is a 
body o f  case law dealing with various aspects o f  the law o f  real 
property  which have led purchasers to question the validity o f  ven­
d o rs ’ titles. Bearing this in mind, this paper  will a t tem p t  to explore 
the C anad ian  case law surrounding some, though by no means all, o f  
the problem areas. O nce this has been done one may be able to draw  
som e tentative conclusions about the present sta te  o f  the doctrine of  
m arke tab le  title in C anada .
PART TWO: SPECIFIC DEFECTS
A. E N C U M B R A N C E S
“ E ncum brance” has no technical m eaning and must be con ­
strued in any particular  instance according to context and  usage.41 
The te rm  is com m only  used to describe outstanding interests in land 
which, if not removed, result in the vendor being unable to convey a 
fee simple absolute. In this sense m ortgages, liens, judgm ents ,  reser­
vations, restrictions, easements and encroachm ents  all constitute  en ­
cum brances on real property. An open contract for the sale o f  land 
implies a conveyance free from encum brances, a contract to 
purchase the “ equi ty” in property  does no t.42
The distinction between encum brances which constitute defects 
in title and those which are merely m atte rs  o f  conveyance is of  
pa ram oun t im portance in this area  since this defines the rights and 
obligations of  both parties to the contract  as outlined above. 
Generally speaking, if the vendor can compel the encum brancer  to 
gran t a discharge prior to the com pletion  o f  the contract,  the en ­
cum brance is a m a tte r  o f  conveyance.4’ This is so even if the value of  
the encum brances exceed the purchase price o f  the proper ty .44 W here 
a vendor sues for dam ages  or specific perform ance o f  a contract 
has been repudiated  by a purchaser  because o f  the existence o f  an en­
cum brance ,  to succeed he must show tha t he had a right to remove 
tha t  encum brance (within the period for completion o f  the contract)  
at the da te  o f  that repudia tion .45 If the purchaser has not elected to
41 Re M aloti and M osher  (1964), 44  D .L .R . (2d) 191 (N .S .S .C .)  Clark v. Raynor  
(1922), 65 D .L .R . 425 (N .S .C .A .);  Jackson  v. Pearldale Ltd. (1962), 47 M .P .R . 
(N .S .C .A .) .
42 Bedm arsky  v. Weleschuk (1961), 29 D .L .R . (2d) 270 (A lta . C .A .).
43 Goodchild  v. Bethel (1919), 19 D .L .R . 161 (A lta . C .A .).
44 Id
45 Sm ith  v. Crawford  (1918), 40  D .L .R . 224 (S ask . C .A .).
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repudiate, it is sufficient th a t  the vendor have a compellable title at 
the da te  o f  the hearing of  the action .4*
Unless time is of  the essence o f  the contract,  the vendor is al­
lowed a reasonable time to clear up m atte rs  of  conveyance.47 Thus, 
for example , a vendor who paid in full for a Crow n g ran t but had not 
received his Paten t by the da te  set for closing the transaction  was 
held not to have been in breach of  his con trac t  for sale o f  that land.4" 
If  at the da te  o f  closing the vendor can neither compel a discharge of 
all encum brances nor obta in the encum brancer’s consent to grant 
such a discharge, his title is unm arke tab le .41'
Although in the norm al contract for the sale o f  land by install­
ments the vendor need only m ake  good title at the date  o f  the last in­
sta llm ent,  the purchaser  can require a reference on title before m a k ­
ing any paym ent.  At that point the vendor must prove tha t  he will be 
able to  convey free from encum brances by the date set for tha t  last 
in s ta l lm en t.50
B. M O R T G A G E S
An undischarged m ortgage is an encum brance which the vendor 
must remove by the closing d a te .51 Agreem ents to purchase subject 
to an existing m ortgage are strictly construed against the vendor. 
Thus  a purchaser  who has agreed to buy land subject to one 
mortgage in a specific am oun t cannot be forced to accept that 
property  subject to two m ortgages, even where they total the same 
am o u n t .52 A vendor is allowed a reasonable time to discharge a 
m ortgage,  but only where he has m ade an honest a t tem pt to obtain a 
discharge prior to the closing d a te ."  Thus where the purchaser has 
specifically requisitioned a discharge well in advance, he can refuse 
to com plete  the transaction  if the vendor, without explanation, 
tenders a m ortgage s ta tem ent and a cheque for the balance.54
A purchaser  can only repudiate a contract on the basis o f  an un­
discharged m ortgage if the vendor is at tha t  t ime unable to discharge 
it pr ior to closing.55 However, even a revocable consent to discharge
46 Baxter v. Derkas, [1925] 4 D .L .R . 801 (S ask . C .A .).
47 Di C astri, op. cit., para. 249, n. (p).
48 Guthrie v. Clark  (1886), 3 M an. L .R . 318 (C .A .).
49 Brandon Steam  Laundry Co. v. Hanna (1909), 19 M an. L .R . 9 (K .B .); affd. 11 
W .L .R . 101 (C .A .).
50 Cameron et al v. Carter et al (1885), 4 O . R. 426 (C han .).
51 Knight v. Cushing. (1912), I. D. L. R. 331 (A lta . C . A ).
52 Sm ith  v. Curtis (1925), 29 O  W N . 163 (2nd Div. C t.).
53 Ungerman et al v. M aroni, [1956] O .W .N . 650 (C .A .).
54 Fong v. Weinpur, [1973] 2 O  R. 760 (H . C t.).
55 Brierly  v. Wallace (1925), 28 O .W .N . 127 (C .A .).
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given by the m ortgagee is sufficient to deprive the purchaser o f  this 
right o f  repudia tion .56
U nder  an installment con trac t  the relevant date  is, as a rule, 
tha t  o f  the last installment since th a t  is usually the agreed da te  for 
passing o f  the tit le .57 This rule is not invariable as the con trac t  may 
manifest ano ther  intention .58 A provision for p repaym ent would 
evidence a con tra ry  intention. Thus a purchaser  under such an agree­
ment could repudiate  it where the property  was subject to a 
m ortgage  redeemable within the installment period but without any 
provision for p repaym en t.59
Generally it is not sufficient that a m ortgage is discharged by 
m ere presum ption ,60 but the passage of  enough time (eg. 80 years)61 
can cure such a defect.  The purchaser  canno t dem and  a written dis­
charge where it is impossible to obta in  one. In such a case it *s suf­
ficient that the vendor give satisfactory p roo f  o f  that the m ortgage 
has been paid. Similarly  a defective written discharge can be cured 
by extrinsic evidence. Thus a recorded d ischarge from someone other 
than the original m ortgagee is sufficient if  the vendor produces an in­
formal assignment by the mortgagee to tha t  person written on the 
back of the original m ortgage.62 A purchaser  can dem and  all neces­
sary docum enta tion  to com plete the discharge; as, for example, 
registration of  letters te s tam entary  where the discharge is given by 
the m ortgagee’s executors.65 The vendor cannot be required to 
produce a superfluous discharge; as, for example , a d ischarge o f  a 
m ortgage  given by a life tenant,  since deceased.64
C. DOW ER
An ou ts tanding  right o f  dower is defect o f  title and not a m a tte r  
o f  conveyance, even if tha t right is the inchoate dower o f  the vendor’s 
wife.65 A purchaser  need not accept such a tit le and may require the
56 Grav  v. Chadwick  (1922), 49 N .B .R . 144 (C han). Brickies v. Snell (1916), 30 
D .L .R . 31 (P  C .).
57 Preston  v. A dilm an  (1915), 21 D .L .R . 869 (S ask . S. C t) ;  Hagen v. Ferris (1915),
21 D .L .R . 868 (S ask . S . Ct.); Warren v. Rogers (1888), 16 O .R . 259; Bostwick 
and Curry v. C oy  (1915), 21 B .C .R . 478 (S . C t.), A purchaser sued for an install­
m ent o f  the purchase price can require that the vendor post security for the d is­
charge o f  the m ortgage.
58 Brandon S team  Laundry Co. v Hanna, supra  n. 49.
59. Knight v. Cushing , supra  n. 51.
60 Barnwell v. Harris (1809), 127 E .R . 901 (in re G round Rent).
61 Im perial Bank o f  Canada v. M etca lf  (1886), 11 O .R . 467 (C han.).
62 R e Mara  (1888), 16 O .R . 391 (C han ).
63 R e Taylor and M artin  (1907), 14 O .L .R . 132.
64 R e Ponton  (1889), 16 O .R . 669 (C han ).
65 Mason  v. Freedman , [1958] S .C .R . 483.
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vendor to use his best efforts to obta in  a release o f  dower. In such a 
case the purchaser  is not entitled to  a conveyance with an aba tem en t  
o f  the purchase price, al though he can require tha t  the vendor m ake  
a sufficient paym ent into court to secure him against any contingent 
exercise o f  tha t dow er right.66 A subsequent abolition o f  dow er by a 
decree o f  d ivorce will not avail a vendor whose tit le was defective at 
the  da te  o f  the issuance o f  the writ in an action for specific p erfo r­
m ance .67
A m erican  au thori ty  recognizes a presum ption  of  extinction in 
the  case o f  long ou ts tanding  dower rights.6* This may be the case in 
C a n ad a ,  especially where recitals in the chain o f  tit le negate the ex­
istence o f  dow er.6’
D. LEASES
Leases and options to lease which extend beyond the date  of  
com pletion  or the da te  upon which the purchaser  is to go into posses­
sion are defects in title.70 W here, however, tha t  lease71 or  option : 
would be defeated by the registration of  the purchaser’s deed, there is 
no breach o f  the vendor’s covenant to give good title. Am erican 
authority  indicates tha t  ou ts tanding  options to renew existing leases 
a re  defect in tit le.73 An outstanding  interest in a growing crop  is a 
chattel interest and will not affect the vendor’s title.74
E. TAXES
Taxes and rates assessed against the property normally  con­
s titute encum brances,  although as m atte rs  of  conveyance and not 
defects in tit le .75 A purchaser is norm ally  entitled to have taxes 
proportioned  pro ratalb even where such taxes are  not yet due, eg., 
only assessed annua lly .7' W here there is a dispute over the am oun t  of 
tax due, the purchaser  can dem and  that the vendor indemnify him 
against possible loss.78 Awareness o f  the existence of  ou ts tanding tax
66  R e Woods and A rth ur, (1921), 58 D .L .R . 620 (O nt. S . C t.).
67 Ungerman  v. M oroni, supra n. 53.
68 Annotation, supra  n. 29, p. 1401 n. 19.
69 R e Lawrason and Sherman  (1930), 27 O .W .N . 474 (W k. Ct.).
70  M atejka  v. King  (1921), 61 D .L .R . 426 (A lta . S . C t.).
71 Crawford and C rawford  v. M ago, [19491 1 W .W .R . 719 (B .C .S .C t.) .
72 Bell and Bell v. Fullerton, [1949] 3 W .W .R . 77 (S ask . S. C t.).
73 Annotation, supra  n. 29, p. 1402 n. 24; p. 1403, n. 28.
74 Gardner v. Staples  (1915), 21 D .L .R . 814 (S ask . S. C t.).
75 Munroe v. M cD onald  (1915), 23 D .L .R . 105 (N .S .C .A .) .
76  Id.
77 Id.
78 Phillips v. M onteith  (1913), II D .L .R . 779 (O nt. S . Ct ).
is not relevant;79 upon later discovery o f  such tax, the purchaser  may 
sue for recovery of  tha t  am o u n t  in an action for breach o f  w arran ty  
o f  tit le.1"’ If the purchaser  has covenanted to pay the taxes on the 
property  pending com pletion and  through his default the property  is 
sold for unpaid taxes, the vendor can m ain ta in  an action for the 
purchse price al though he is unable to convey title to  the p r o p e r ty /1
W hether  a s ta tu te  o r  by-law imposes a charge on the person or 
against the property  is a question of  construction. O ne  must also dis­
tinguish between charges on the property to be removed by the ven­
dor, eg..
1. Tile Drainage Act  R .S .O .  1914, c. 44 ,1,2
2. Local Im provem ent Rates in O ntario ;"5 and taxes to be ap ­
portioned between the parties, eg.,
3. Local Im provem ent Rates in Alberta.*4
F. JU D G E M E N T S A N D  OTHER C H A R G E S O N  L A N D
Judgm ents  against the vendor filed in the county where the land 
to be sold is located are encum brances, even though they have been 
filed subsequent to the execution of  the agreem ent o f  sale. The court 
will not expose a purchaser to possible litigation to prove the priority 
o f  his agreement.*5 Similarly undischarged lis pendens,"6 caveats ,"7 
powers of  attorney,** previously registered agreem ents for sale,"9 
specific legacies and m ain tenance agreem ents  touching the land9" all 
form encum brances. W here doubtful questions arise because o f  the
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79 Freeman v. Calverly  (1916), 27 D .L .R . 394 (M an. C .A .).
80 Id.
81 Label v. D obbie , {1919] 2 W .W .R . 483.
82 Re R ow ell and Forbes (1920), 19 O .W .N . 104.
83 R e Taylor and M artyn , supra n. 63.
84 Neitsch  v. Muiek  (1969), 70 W .W .R . 630 (A lta . D. C t.).
85 Spohn  v. Ryckm an  (1859), 7 Gr. 389; An execution  against a cestui que trust 
w hose beneficial interest in the property is extinguished does not affect the title: 
R e Toronto General Trust Corpn. v. Christie (1927), 33 O .W .N . 168 (W k. C t.). 
But where the vendor h im self holds an unsatisfied judgm ent against a purchaser 
under a form er agreem ent o f  sale, the title is defective: H arvey  v. Malanchuk 
(1931), 40  M an. L. R. 78 (C .A .).
86 R e Bobier (1888), 16 O .R . 259 (Q .B .).
87 Warren v. Rogers (1914), 6 W .W .R . 1062 (M an. K .B.).
88 R e B obier, supra  n. 86.
89 Paulter Holdings Ltd. v. K arrys Invest Ltd. (1961), 28 D .L .R . (2d) 642 (O nt. 
H .C t) .
90  It is a question o f  construction whether such agreem ents im pose a charge on the 
land: Baker v. The Trusts and Guarantee Co. e l al (1898), 29 O .R . 456 (S . Ct.); 
or m erely a personal obligation: R e Fagan and Dawson  (1909), 18 O .L .R . 638.
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bankrup tcy  of  the vendor,’1 the possibility o f  fraudulent conveyances 
in the chain o f  ti tle,92 or where the debts o f  the deceased owner ex­
ceed the value of  his personal es ta te ,93 the land is not m arketab le .  It 
is not however a defect in title tha t  an estate  has not been a d ­
ministered if the decedent left no debts and had no creditors .94 W here 
the Federal G overnm ent claims par t  o f  the land to be sold as a 
“ Public H a rb o u r”  by virtue o f  s. 108 of  the British North America  
Act,  the title is defective.95 W here  a purchaser  negotiates with the 
vendor for the removal of  such encum brances he will not be taken  to 
have waived his right to enforce tha t  removal in cou r t .96
G. RESER VA TIONS A N D  E X CEPTIO N S
A purchaser  is prima facie  entitled to a conveyance free from 
any reservations or exceptions97 not contained in the Crown g ran t .9" 
He need not prove tha t  the vendor’s inability to convey, for example, 
mineral rights adversely affects the value of  the property. Discovery 
of  tha t  inability gives the purchaser  an im m edia te  right to repudiate 
the agreem ent.99 In the norm al agreem ent for sale the term  “ land” 
includes mineral r igh ts ,100 even if those rights are acquired by the 
vendor after execution o f  the agreem ent but before closing.101 A gree­
ments lessening the vendor’s obligations a re  very strictly construed 
against them. Thus an agreem ent to purchase subject to “ reser­
vations”  does not preclude repudiation based on the existence of  and 
“ except ion” in the chain o f  ti t le .102 An agreem ent of  sale based on the 
mistaken assum ption o f  both parties that the Crown gran t did not in­
clude mineral rights may be rectified so as to allow conveyance o f  the 
entire fee to the purchaser .103
91 S loper v. Fish (1813), 35 E .R . 274.
92 Annotation , supra  n. 29, 1408 n. 64.
93 Ibid., p. 1490 et seq.
94 Id.
95 R odd  v. Cronin, (1936] 2 D .L .R . 377 (S .C .C .).
96 Ballantyne v. H ettinger (1914), 7 W .W .R . 526 (A lta . S . C t.).
97 Burke v. Popoy, (1923] 2 W .W .R . 648 (Sask . K .B.); Crump v. M cN eil, [1919] I 
W .W .R . 52 (A lta . C .A .) ; . Bellam y v. Debenham, [1891] 1 Ch. 413 (C .A .); 
Universal Land Sec. Co. v. Jackson  (1917), 33 D .L .R . 764, (A lta . C .A .); 
A rm strong  v. Spraling el al, [1925] 1 D .L .R . 914 (S ask . C .A .).
98 Ball v. Gutschenritter, supra n. 2.
99 Innes v. Costello, supra  n. 14.
100 H obbs v. E & N  Ry. Co. (1898), 29 S .C .R . 450.
101 Ferguson v. Saunders (1958), 12 D .L .R . (2d) 688 (A lta . C .A .).
102 R ayfuse  v. M ugleston, (1954) 3 D .L .R . 360 (B .C .C .A .).
103 Schorb  v. Public Trustee (1953), 8 W .W .R . 677, affd. 11 W .W .R . 132 (A lta . 
C .A .).
Colony Oil & Gas Co. v. Showers, [1938] 3 W .W .R . 739 (S ask . K .B.).
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H. B U ILD IN G  R E S T R IC T IO N S
Enforceable private building restrictions are encum brances104 
regardless o f  whether or  not they actually affect the value o f  the 
land; or, it would seem, whether or not the purchaser’s objection is 
bona f ide .m If a vendor is to defeat such a general objection he must, 
after adducing all necessary evidence pertaining to the enforceability 
of  the restr ic tion ,106 either show tha t  it is unenforceable107 (eg., 
because o f  the changed character  of the neighbourhood)10" or 
p roduce a clearly effective release.109 If  the purchaser  has objected 
tha t the restriction prohibits some proposed or existing use o f  the 
property, the court will only address itself to tha t  specific point, eg., 
duplexes,"0 apa r tm en t  buildings,1" v e randahs ,"2 g a ra g es ."3 There is 
very little case law involving other types o f  private restr ic tions."4 
W here there is reasonable doubt as to the enforceability o f  a restric­
t io n ," 5 or as to the validity o f  some specific use proposed by the 
pu rchaser ,"6 the vendor’s title is not m arketable.
If the purchaser  has agreed to buy subject to all res tr ic t ions"7 or 
covenants running with the land"* he loses his right to object to most
104 Flight V. Booth  (1834), 131 E .R . 1160.
105 Foley v. Lipson  (1918). 14 O  W N . 269 (H . C t.).
106 R e Beatty and Brown (1915), 7 O  W N . 846 (H . C t.).
107 R e Addison and Bradbury (1921), 19 O .W .N . 472 (W k. C t.).
108 R e M ontgom ery and M iller (1918), 13 O .W .N . 399 (H . Ct.); R e Rvding and 
Clover (1920), ¡9  O W N .  235 (W k. Ct.); R e Wheeler and R ay f ie ld  (1925), 29 
O .W .N . 277 (W k. C t.).
109 R e Seaman and Ward  (1919), 17 O .W .N . 8 (W k. C t.).
R e R ooke and Sm ith  (1914), 6 O  W N . 382, 503 (H . C t.).
110 Re Hoidge and Davidson  (1923), 25 O .W .N . 430 (W k. Ct.);
R e James and Cults (1922), 52 O .R . 453 (W k. C t.);
Re Toronto Gen. Tr. Corpn. and Crowley  (1928), 34 O .W .N . 148 (W k. C t.).
111 R e Robertson and Depoe (1911), 3 O .W .N . 431 (H . C t.).
112 Fisher v. G oldoff, [1942] O .W .N  490 (H . C t.).
113 R e Dunlop and Elliott (1920), 18 O  W N . 182 (W k. C t.).
114 R e Godson and Casselman (1915), 18 O .W .N . 480  (W k. Ct.); R estraint on 
A lienation.
Re N orth G rover Pub. S. Bd. and Todd , [1968] I O  R. 63 (C .A .): Fee Sim ple  
Subject to  C ondition  Subsequent.
115 R e R oyal Trust Co. and Fisher and Lawson  (1922), 22 O .W .N . 169 (W k. Ct.).
116 R e Heynes and Pulver (1923), 25 O .W .N . 269 (W k. Ct.);
R e Rapp and Davidson  (1930, 38 O .W .N . 270 (W k. C t.).
117 M iller v. Young <1918). 14 O W N. 130 (Ist  Div. Ct.).
118 S ch o lo ffv . R eeder (1915), 22 D .L .R . 770 (O nt. S . C t.).
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restrictions. An agreem ent to  accept the vendor’s title does not 
preclude objections based on restrictions o f  which the purchaser  has 
no no tice ,"’ or  m ore extensive than those which he had agreed to ac­
ce p t .120 In all three cases a purchaser  can object to  an existing breach 
o f  a restriction o f  which he had no notice and which m ateria lly  af­
fects the subject m atte r  o f  the sa le .12'
The effect o f  zoning restrictions on executory contracts  for the 
sale o f  land is quite unclear.122 There  is som e au thori ty  which treats  
restrictions in the sam e m anner  as private building restr ic tions,12' but 
other  authori ty  trea ts  them as having no effect w hatsoever.124 There 
is support for the proposition tha t  a zoning change intervening 
between the execution and com pletion o f  an agreem ent o f  sale is a 
defect going to the root o f  t i t le .12- I f  the agreem ent o f  sale specifically 
provides tha t  the land is not subject to any zoning restriction, the ex­
istence o f  such restriction will give the purchaser  an im m edia te  right 
o f  repudia tion  without having to prove tha t  any prejudice would be 
done  to him by such a restr ic tion .126 Actual knowledge of  an existing 
breach o f  a zoning by-law has been held to preclude a purchaser 
from objecting to tit le ,127 and there is som e authori ty  for the proposi­
tion tha t purchasers are deemed to have constructive knowledge of  
all zoning provisions.128 While it is clear that contracts  knowingly 
m ade  in contravention o f  zoning restrictions are  contrary  to public 
policy,12’ it is possible tha t  any agreem ent violating such a provision 
is ta in ted  with illegality.130
/ .  EASEMENTS  -
The com m on law held tha t  an easem ent which was a visible, or 
“ p a ten t” defect such as would put a p ruden t purchaser  on inquiry 
could not be raised as an objection to the vendor’s t i t le .131 “ P a te n t” 
in this context has com e to mean “ e ither  visible to  the eye or arising
119 Western Can. Inv. Co. v. M cD iarm id  (1922). 66 D .L .R . 457 (S ask . C .A .).
120 Flight v. Booth, supra , n. 104; Coaffee  v. Thompson  (1912), 5 D .L .R . 9 (M an. 
K .B.).
121 M cA leer  v. Desjardine, (1948) 4 D. L. R. 40  (O nt. C. A .).
122 Danforth Heights Ltd. v. M cD erm id Bros. (1922), 52 O  R. 412 (C .A .).
123 Bard  v. Duggan , [1955] O  W N . 246 (H . Ct.); Re Pentacost (1927), 33 O  W N . 
233 (H . C t.).
124 R e Pongrate and Zubyr, [1954] O .W .N . 597 (H . C t.).
125 Innés et al v. Van de W eerdhof (1970), 10 D .L .R . (3d) 722.
126 Taback v. Rosenberg, 56 M an. L .R . 121 (K .B .).
127 Valentine v. Chutorian  (1950), 1 D .L .R . 292 (M an. C .A .).
128 Winth v. Kutarna  (1955), 5 D .L .R . 785 (S ask . C .A .).
129 Glenn v. Harix Const. Co., [1938] O  W N . 405 (C .A .).
130 Winth v. Kutarna, supra  n. 128.
131 Bowler v. Round  (1800), 31 E .R . 707.
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by necessary implication from something visible to  the eye.” 132 Thus 
a right o f  way which a purchaser could reasonably have interpreted 
to be a private path  was found to be a “ la ten t” defec t . '33 Professor 
Bora Laskin, as he then was, has criticized this doctrine. He suggests 
tha t  it would not, in any event, qualify an express covenant to  give 
good tit le .134 T here  seems to be only one C anad ian  case where the 
court has found such a defect to be p a ten t .135 While there is 
A m erican  au thori ty  tha t easem ents  for the public good (eg., power 
lines, sewers) cannot be the subject o f  objections to ti t le ,1,6 the 
English and C anad ian  case law stands opposed to this con ten t ion .137
Subject to the above qualifications, easem ents will generally 
constitu te  encum brances. Thus  an 8 foot w ide131' and a 10 foot w ide131' 
r ight o f  way, as well as a jo in t  right o f  way over a com m on sta ir ­
ca se140 have all been held to be defects in title. If  the purchaser has 
expressly contracted  for a right o f  way, he may repudiate  his con­
trac t if tha t right o f  way is doub tfu l ,141 or if less extensive than  tha t 
for which he co n trac ted .142 In one reported  case, the rights o f  way 
over a property  were so extensive (covering a full third of  the 
premises) tha t  a M anitoba  court allowed rescission o f  an executed 
co n t ra c t .143
A party  wall which depreciates the value of  the property  is n o r­
mally a defect in t i t le ,144 but it is unclear if the sam e is true where 
there is no evidence of  such deprec ia t ion .145 W here a purchaser  has 
agreed to purchase subject to a pa r ty  wall it is not a defect in title 
that the m id-point of  that wall extends beyond the borders  o f  his
132 Yandle v. S u tton , [1922] 2 Ch. 199 (S argeant, J.).
133 Id.
134 Law S ociety  o f  U pper Canada. Special Lectures. I960, Sale o f  Land. 389, 391 el 
seq.
135 Lubienski v. Silverm an, [1932] 3 D .L .R . 320 (O nt. C .A . C han.).
136 A nnotation, supra  n. 29, p. 1428.
137 Re Brewer (1899), 80  L.T. (N .S .)  127; R e Packett, [1902] 2 Ch. 258; Pemsel v. 
Tucker, [1907] 2 Ch. 191; R owland v. Ransford  (1919), 2 W .W .R . 486 (A lta .
C .A .); Joy dan Dev. Ltd. v. H iLite H. L td., [1927] 1 O .R . 482 (H . Ct.): property 
subject to  “ easem en t” actually  vested in lee sim ple in power com pany.
138 Fesserton  v. Wilkinson  (1914), 6 O .W .N . 347 (H . C t.).
139 R e Fielding (1929), 36 O .W .N . 26 (W k. C t.).
140 Dineen v. Young (1909), 13 O .W .R . 722.
141 Anoni v. Wilson (1915), 9 O .W .N . 295 (W k. C t.).
142 R e Capital Trust Corp el at (1931), 40  O .W .N . 463 (W k. C t.).
143 Tomoch  v. N .B  Can.Trust Co. Lid. (1936), 44 M an. L .R . 1 (K .B .).
144 Lavine v. Independent Builders Ltd. (1932), 4 D .L .R . 569 (O nt. C .A .).
145 Im perial Bank o f  Canada v. M etcalf, supra n. 61; but cf. Lavine v. Independent
Builders L td ., supra n. 144.
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property . H e is not entitled to an exact half  o f  the wall.146
Easem ents  will not support an objection to tit le if they are unen­
forceable, eg., im properly c re a te d ,147 barred  by s ta tu te ,148 or arise out 
o f  a f rustra ted  c o n tra c t .149 A purchaser  cannot object to  an easem ent 
if he was him self responsible for its c re a t io n .150
J. E N CR OA CH M E N  TS
If  p roperty  being purchased encroaches upon neighbouring land 
or a street this is norm ally  a defect in title:
(i) a 2 Vi”  encroachm ent o f  a house on neighbouring land ,151
(ii) a stable encroaching on a h ighw ay,152
(iii) an eave encroaching on adjoining air space ,153
(iv) a stoop encroaching on a s t ree t ,154
(v) a 6”  encroachm ent of  a po rch ,155
(vi) a 4 ”  encroachm ent o f  a wall .156
In the last case, the defect was found to go to the root o f  title. 
Encroachm ents  give the purchaser  a right to aba tem ent o f  the 
purchase p r ice157 or an action for breach of  w ar ra n ty ,158 but not to 
rescission o f  an executed c o n t ra c t .159
There is some support  for the application o f  the de minimus 
principle to extremely small encroachm ents .  Thus a \ 3A" encroach­
m ent o f  an eave upon a street gave rise to a small aba tem ent o f  price, 
but was not sufficient to allow the purchaser  to  repud ia te .160 In 
ano ther  case, a small encroachm ent by a verandah was held to  have 
no legal consequences.161 T h a t  decision was distinguished in a la ter
146 W oodrow  v. Connor, (1922), 52 O .L .R . 631 (C .A .).
147 Sum ner v. M cIntosh  (1917), 35 D .L .R . 336 (S ask . S . C t.).
148 Jackm ar Dev. Ltd. v. Sm ith  (1973), 1 O .R . (2d) 87 (H . C t.).
149 P igott v. Bell (1913), 25 O .W .R . 266 (H . Ct.); but cf. R e Pigoli and Bell (1913),
24 O .W .R . 863 (W k. C t.).
150 R e Boulton and Garfunkel (1912), 4 O .W .N . 263 (H . C t.).
152 R e Davis and M oss (1918), 15 O .W .N . I l l  (H . C t.).
153 Id.
154 H eifitz  v. Goral, [1950] O .W .N . 854 (H . C t.).
155 R e Fowler and Cawfield  (1926), 29 O  W N . 245 (H . C t.).
156 Brown v. Laffradi, [1961] O .W .N . 263 (H . C t.).
157 R e Maclarne and Connor (1925), 28 O .W .N . 14 (W k. C t.).
158 H ickman v. Warman  (1918), 15 O .W .N . 201 (2ns Div. Ct.); 4 ” encroachm ent.
159 Quick  v. Wilkinson  (1930), 39 O  W N . 42 , affd. 39 O .W .N . 276 (C .A .): 3’ - 4 ’ 
encroachm ent.
160 Martin v. K ellogg , [1932] 2 D .L .R . 496 (O nt. S . C t.).
161 R e M archm ent, [1947] O .W .N . 363 (H.  C t.).
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case on the basis tha t the encroachm ent o f  the verandah would not 
affect the purchaser’s proposed use o f  the property . In tha t  la ter case 
it was held tha t  a s toop located entirely on the street materia lly  af­
fected the proposed use o f  the land .“ 2 The O n ta r io  C o u r t  o f  A p ­
pea l163 recently rejected an a t tem pt to  apply the “ p a ten t” defect 
theory  to a case involving a large encroachm ent o f  a loading p la t­
form  upon neighbouring land. While the re  seems to be no C anad ian  
case law on the effect o f  neighbouring structures encroaching upon 
the premises to be sold, it is suggested tha t  such cases would be 
trea ted  in a m anner  analogous to ea sem en ts .164
If the vendor can prove tha t  he has acquired title to the land be­
ing encroached upon, the purchaser  is obliged to accept a conveyance 
o f  the original property  along with the property  so acqu ired .16' If  tha t 
claim is doubtful (as where, for example, it depends upon the resolu­
tion o f  the question of  whether a lane being encroached upon is 
public or private, itself being an uncertain ty)  the purchaser will not 
be forced to accept his t i t le .166
P A R T  T H R E E :  C O N C L U S IO N
As must now be manifest to the reader, a study o f  the doctrine 
o f  m arke tab le  title necessitates a som ew hat tedious com pila tion  o f  
particulars.  It would be extremely artificial to a t tem pt to extract any 
b road  synthesis from these materia ls ,  most o f  which represent 
isolated, self-sufficient points o f  law. Since it is possible, however, 
tha t  this com pendium  of facts will prove to be the most valuable ele­
m ent o f  this paper, this may excuse the  pedantic m anner  of  their ex­
pression.
The C anad ian  practitioner must contend with an absence of  
precedent in m any  im portan t  areas. O ne  may at tr ibu te  this lack of 
reported  decisions variously to the tendency to settle such disputes, 
s tandard-fo rm  contracts  allowing vendors to rescind ra the r  than  
meet objections, or the professional stance o f  those who have cer­
tified questionable titles. This has, in any event, the practical conse­
quence o f  augm enting the theoretical difficulty o f  dealing with the 
subject m a tte r  o f  m arke tab le  titles. Inevitably, one must rely heavily 
on the use o f  analogy. Fortunate ly , it is subm itted , there are no p rac­
tical o r  theoretical barriers  to the use o f  A m erican  case law for the 
purposes o f  supplementing deficiencies in our own.
162 H eifilz  v. Gural, supra  n. 154.
163 R e M ountroy Ltd. et al, [1955] O .R . 352 (H . C t.), affd. [1955] 3 D .L .R . 840  
(C .A .).
164 Annotation , supra  n. 29, p. 1444 et seq.
165 R e Butler and Henderson  (1912), 23 O .W .R . 576 (H . C t.).
166 R e Goldenberg and Glass (1925), 56 O .R . 414  (C .A .): 8 ” encroachm ent.
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M any reported  decisions are  concerned with whether som e p ar ­
ticular feature of  the title can properly be te rm ed an encum brance,  
eg., an option to  renew a lease. This area  o f  the law is largely 
resolved and presents few problem s. The m ajo r  source o f  difficulty is 
in the area where one must determ ine whether a recognized en ­
cum brance  actually renders a title questionable, eg., an 80 year old 
undischarged mortgage. It is a t  this point tha t  one must invoke the 
“ reasonable d o u b t” analysis o f  the m arke tab le  title doctrine. The 
English law in this area  is quite clear. The question then becomes 
w hether the C anad ian  case law has somehow inferentially altered the 
m eaning of  the te rm  “ m a rk e tab le” .
Initially one m ust note the  evolution of  a jur is  prudential p resum p­
tion o f  the extinction o f  long ou ts tanding  in terests ,167 and also o f  one 
in favour of  the evidentiary validity o f  recitals .168 If  used in m odera ­
tion, these devices are  not essentially contrad ic tory  to the 
“ reasonable d o u b t”  analysis, and can greatly  facilitate real estate 
transactions.  There  is, however, some very questionable precedent 
where such a p resum ption  has prevailed over direct evidence to the 
co n t ra ry .169 T here  are  o ther  examples o f  decisions which ignore 
significant elements o f  doubt:
(1) leases defeated by the vendor’s deed ,170
(2) a fee simple arising out o f  a void condition subsequen t,171
(3) easements destroyed by the operation  of  the doctrine of  
f rus tra t ion .172
It is submitted that all of  these cases presented a real th rea t  of li tiga­
tion to the prospective purchaser. This must be contrasted  with the 
clear apprecia tion  o f  the im portance  o f  the “ reasonable d o u b t” con­
cept illustrated in cases involving disputed tax liability17' and ou t­
s tanding executions.174
As has been pointed out, there is considerable doubt as to the 
application o f  the “ p a ten t”  concept to the C anad ian  law of  ease­
ments. O u r  courts  have remained mute in the face o f  the im portan t  
policy considerations behind this problem. The issue o f  zoning provi­
sions and their  effect on executory contracts  for the sale o f  land is far 
from resolved. Certain ly  this is o f  some im portance in the average
167 Im perial Bank o f  Canada v. M e tca lf  supra n. 61.
168 R e Lawrason and Sherman, supra  n. 69.
169 Gunn c. Turner, supra n. 38.
170 Crawford and Crawford  v. M ago, supra  n. 71.
171 R e N orth G rover Pub. S. Bd. v. Todd, supra, n. 114.
172 Pigott v. Bell, supra  n. 149
173 Phillips v. M onteith, supra n. 78.
174 Spohn  v. R yckm an, supra  n. 85.
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real es tate  transaction . While this writer would suggest th a t  to  trea t  
such provisions in the sam e m anner  as private restrictions is more 
consonan t with prevailing authority , at this point in t im e the m a tte r  
m ust rem ain  purely speculative. The  nature ,  extent and opera tion  of  
the de minimus rule as it applies to encroachm ents  is com pletely un­
clear. Finally, none of  the C anad ian  case law dealing with encroach­
ments seems to have dealt with the problem  o f  encroachm ent by 
neighbouring premises on the land to be purchased.
These factors com bine to point to a general lack o f  coherence in 
the trea tm en t  o f  title problems. O ne might a t tem pt to rationalize 
these discrepancies on the basis o f  judicial evolution o f  a “ new” 
theory o f  m arke tab le  title. It is subm itted  tha t this app roach  is un­
tenable. T he  m ore natura l conclusion is tha t  C anad ian  courts  tend to 
confuse titles o f  doubtful validity with invalid titles. The prac tit ioner 
is left in the unenviable position o f  having to educate the court as to 
the content o f  the term “ m a rk e tab le” , and at the sam e tim e cope 
with a considerable bias in the case law in favour o f  vendors. O ne can 
only hope tha t  the future will see a g rea ter  apprecia tion  o f  the im por­
tance o f  the doctrine o f  m arke tab le  title. The  C anad ian  law o f  ven­
dor and purchaser  would be significantly clarified by a greater 
degree o f  uniform ity in the application of  tha t  doctrine.
